Introduction
Within the rational expectations and representative agent paradigm, the SharpeLintner-Mossin (Sharpe 1964 , Lintner 1965 and Mossin 1966 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the most widely used tool to value returns on risky assets. However, there is considerable empirical evidence documenting cyclical behaviour of market characteristics, including risk premium, volatility, trading volume, price and dividend ratio, and in particular, market betas. The conditional CAPM was developed to provide a convenient way to incorporate time-varying beta and it exhibits empirical superiority in explaining the cross-section of returns and anomalies.
1 There exists a large literature on time-varying beta models, but most of it is motivated by econometric estimation. It is often assumed that there are discrete changes in betas across subsamples but constant betas within subsamples.
2 It has been shown that when betas vary over time, the standard OLS inference is misspecified and cannot be used to assess the fit of a conditional CAPM. In addition, most of the econometric models of time-varying beta lack any economic explanation and intuition.
Most theoretical models on conditional CAPM are based on the representative agent economy by assuming perfect rationality and homogeneous beliefs. However, empirical evidence along with unconvincing justification of the assumption of unbounded rationality and investor psychology, have led to the incorporation of both heterogeneity in beliefs and bounded rationality into asset pricing and financial market modelling (see the survey papers in the edited handbook of Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2009) See, for example, Engle (1982) , Bollerslev (1986) , Bollerslev et al (1988) , Dybvig and Ross (1985) , Hansen and Richard (1987) , Hamilton (1989 Hamilton ( , 1990 , Braun et al (1990) , and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) .
2
See Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , Fama and French (2006) , and Lewellen and Nagel (2006) ). We point out that Ang and Chen (2007) treat betas as endogenous variables that vary slowly and continuously over time.
financial markets as a nonlinear expectation-feedback system and reflect the interaction of heterogeneity, bounded rationality and adaptive behaviour of agents.
Following the seminal work of Hommes (1997, 1998) , various HAMs have been developed to show that, when agents increasingly switch to better performing strategies, this rational behaviour of agents can lead to instability of financial markets. This framework can also explain various types of market behaviour, such as the long-term swing of market prices from the fundamental prices, asset bubbles, market crashes, the stylized facts and various kinds of power law behaviour observed in financial markets. The aim of this paper is to extend the HAMs with one risky asset to an evolutionary CAPM within the framework of HAMs to examine the impact of adaptive behaviour of heterogeneous agents in a market with many risky assets. This paper is closely related to Chiarella et al (2012) , but also differs from it in several respects. In We refer the reader to Hommes (2006) , LeBaron (2006) , Lux (2009) , Chiarella et al (2009) , Evstigneev, Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2009) for surveys of the recent developments in this literature.
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We refer the reader to Chiarella et al (2005) , Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) , Chen and Huang (2008) and Marsili, Raffaelli and Ponsot (2009) for developments in multi-asset market dynamics in the literature of HAMs. In particular, Westerhoff (2004) considers a multi-asset model with fundamentalists who concentrate on only one market and chartists who invest in all markets; Westerhoff (2010a, 2010b ) explore deterministic models to study two stock markets denominated in different currencies, which are linked via the related foreign exchange market; Chen and Huang (2008) develop a computational multi-asset artificial stock market to examine the relevance of risk preferences and forcasting accuracy to the survival of investors; and Marsili et al. (2009) introduce a generic model of a multi-asset financial market to show that correlation feedback can lead to market instability when trading volumes are high. Chiarella et al (2012) , the heterogeneous beliefs are modelled at the return level and agents do not change their strategies. A spill-over effect of market instability from one asset to others due to behavioural change of agents is demonstrated through numerical simulations. In this paper, the heterogeneous beliefs are modelled at the price level and agents are allowed to change their strategies based on a fitness function similar to that used by Hommes (1997, 1998) . The advantage of this setting is that we are able to examine the stability and spill-over effects analytically.
We extend the single-period static model in to a dynamic equilibrium asset pricing model. As in Chiarella et al (2012) , we incorporate two types of investors, fundamentalists and trend followers, into the model. It is found that the instability of one asset, characterized by large fluctuations of market prices from the fundamental prices, can spill over to other assets when agents increasingly switch to better performing strategies. The spill-over effect is also associated with high trading volumes and persistent volatility, characterized by significantly positive and geometrically decaying autocorrelations in volume and volatility over long time horizons. Also the correlations between trading volume and volatility of risky assets are positive when asset payoffs are less correlated. These implications show that the evolutionary CAPM developed in this paper can provide insight into market characteristics related to trading volume and volatility. Also consistent with Chiarella et al (2012) , we show that the commonly used rolling window estimates of time-varying betas may not be consistent with the ex-ante betas implied by the equilibrium model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a dynamical equilibrium asset pricing model in the context of the CAPM to incorporate heterogeneous beliefs and adaptive behaviour of agents. Section 3 examines analytically the stability of the steady state equilibrium prices of the corresponding deterministic model. In Section 4, we conduct a numerical analysis of the stochastic model to explore the spill-over effects, together with the relation between trading volumes and volatility, and the consistency of time-varying betas between ex-ante and rolling window estimates.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
The Model
We consider an economy with I agents, indexed by i = 1, · · · , I, who invest in portfolios consisting of a riskless asset with risk free rate r f and N risky assets, indexed by j = 1, · · · , N (with N ≥ 1). Let p t = (p 1,t , · · · , p N,t ) ⊤ be the prices,
⊤ be the dividends and x t := p t + d t be the payoffs of the risky assets in period t (from t − 1 to t). Let z i,t be the risky portfolio of agent i (in terms of the number of shares of each risky asset), then the end-of-period portfolio wealth of agent i is given by
2.1. Optimal Portfolio. Assume that agent i has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility u i (x) = −e −θ i x , where θ i is the CARA coefficient. Assuming that the wealth of agent i is conditionally normally distributed, agent i's optimal investment portfolio is obtained by maximizing the certainty-equivalent utility of one-periodahead wealth
Following , the optimal portfolio of agent i is then given by
where E i,t (x t+1 ) and Ω i,t = [Cov i,t (x j,t+1 , x k,t+1 )] N ×N are respectively the conditional expectation and variance-covariance matrix of agent i about the end-of-period payoffs of the risky assets, evaluated at time t.
2.2. Market Equilibrium. Assume that the I investors can be grouped into H agent-types, indexed by h = 1, · · · , H, where the agents within the same group are homogeneous in their beliefs as well as risk aversion. The risk aversion of agents of type h is denoted by θ h . We also denote by I h,t the number of investors in group h and by n h,t := I h,t /I the market fraction of agents of type h in period t. Let E h,t (x t+1 )
and Ω h,t = [Cov h,t (x j,t+1 , x k,t+1 )] N ×N be respectively the conditional expectation and variance-covariance matrix of type-h agents at time t. Let s = (s 1 , · · · , s N ) ⊤ be the N-dimensional vector of average risky asset supply per agent. A supply 5 As is well known, the maximization of (2.1) is equivalent to maximizing the expected value of the above-defined CARA utility of wealth, max zi,t E i,t (u i (W i,t+1 )), provided that W i is conditionally normally distributed in agent i's beliefs.
shock to the market, denoted by a vector of random processes, 6 is assumed to follow
, where κ t+1 is a standard normal i.i.d. random variable with E(κ t ) = 0 and Cov(κ t ) = I. Then the market clearing condition becomes
2.3. Consensus Belief. We follow the construction in Chiarella et al ( , 2012 to define an aggregate or consensus belief. Define the "average" risk aversion coefficient θ a,t := (
, which is a market population fraction weighted harmonic mean of the risk aversions of different types of heterogeneous agents.
Specifically, if all agents have the same risk aversion coefficient θ h = θ, then the "average" risk aversion coefficient θ a,t = θ. 7 Then the aggregate beliefs at time t about variances/covariances and expected payoffs over the time interval (t, t + 1) are specified, respectively, as
(2.4)
The dividend process d t is assumed to follow a martingale process
where ζ t+1 is a standard normal i.i.d. random variable with E(ζ t ) = 0 and Cov(ζ t ) = I, independent of κ t+1 . Moreover, agents are assumed to have homogeneous and correct conditional beliefs about the dividends (the unconditional expectation of which is assumed to be constant, E(d t ) = d). Following Chiarella et al ( , 2012 , the market equilibrium prices (2.3) can therefore be rewritten as if they were determined by a homogeneous agent endowed with average risk aversion θ a,t and the consensus beliefs {E a,t , Ω a,t }, namely
(2.6) 6 σ κ is not necessarily a diagonal matrix, that is, the supply noise processes of the N assets can be correlated. The same also holds for σ ζ in the dividend processes (2.5).
Note that at time t the dividends d t are realized and agents formulate their beliefs about the next period payoff x t+1 = p t+1 + d t+1 , based on realized prices up to time t − 1 and the dividends d t .
2.4. Fitness. Following the discrete choice model (discussed for instance by Hommes (1997, 1998) , the market fractions n h,t of agents of type h are determined by their fitness v h,t−1 , where the subscript t − 1 indicates that fitness depends only on past observed prices and dividends. The fraction of agents using strategy of type h is thus driven by "experience" through reinforcement learning. That is,
given the fitness v h,t−1 , the fraction of agents using strategy type of h is determined by the discrete choice model,
where η > 0 is the switching intensity of choice parameter measuring how sensitive agents are to selecting a better preforming strategy. 8 If η = 0, then agents are insensitive to past performance and pick a strategy at random with equal probability.
In the other extreme case η → ∞, all agents choose the forecast that performed best in the last period. An increase in the intensity of choice η can therefore represent an increase in the degree of rationality with respect to the evolutionary selection of strategies.
Given the utility maximization problem (2.1) of agents, we use a fitness measure that generalizes the 'risk-adjusted profit' introduced in Hommes (2001) for all h. According to the fitness measure v h,t := π h,t − π B h,t − C h , their portfolios would thus have identical performance (apart from the costs). In other words, the selected fitness measure v h,t is not affected by mere differences in risk aversion and accounts only of the profitability generated by the competing investment rules. Note that, in the case of zero supply of outside shares, the market clearing equation (2.6) leads to E a,t (x t+1 )/R f = p t . This is the case considered in Hommes (2001) for a single-risky-asset model. The market thus behaves as if it were 'risk-neutral' at the aggregate level 9 in this particular case and the performance measure reduces to the risk-adjusted profit considered in Hommes (2001).
2.5. Fundamentalists. Now we propose a model with classical heterogeneous agenttypes and consider two types of agents, fundamentalists and trend followers, or chartists, with h = f and h = c, respectively. Following He and Li (2007) , the fundamentalists realize the existence of non-fundamental traders, such as trend followers to be introduced in the following discussion. The fundamentalists believe that the stock price may be driven away from the fundamental value in the short-run, but it will eventually converge to the expected fundamental value in the long-run.
Hence the conditional mean of the fundamental traders is assumed to follow of the fundamentalists toward their expected fundamental value or it reflects how confident they are in the fundamental value. The parameter α j can be different for different risky assets. In particular, for α j = 1, the fundamental traders are fully confident about the fundamental value of risky asset j and adjust their expected price in the next period instantaneously to the expected fundamental value. For α j = 0, the fundamentalists become naive traders of asset j. We also assume that the fundamentalists have constant beliefs about the covariance matrix of the payoffs
2.6. Fundamental Prices. To define the fundamental price p * t , we consider a 'standard CAPM' with homogeneous beliefs where all agents have correct beliefs about the fundamental prices and are fully confident about their expected fundamental values (that is α = diag[1, · · · , 1]). We also assume that their average risk aversion coefficient is constant over time, θ a,t = θ, and so are their common secondmoment beliefs, Ω 0 .
10 Correspondingly we define the fundamental price as
which is a martingale process under the assumptions about the exogenous dividend and market noise processes, so that
In this case, it follows from Eq. (2.6) that the equilibrium price is given by p t = p * t . Thus we can treat the benchmark CAPM case as the 'steady state' of the dynamics of the heterogeneous beliefs model.
10 Without switching, the average risk aversion θ is constant and corresponds to the harmonic mean of the risk aversion coefficients of all agents. In our simulations, we will set θ = θ * a , the average risk aversion coefficient at the steady state solution of the model.
Trend Followers.
Unlike the fundamental traders, trend followers are technical traders who believe the future price change can be predicted from various patterns or trends generated from the historical prices. They are assumed to extrapolate the latest observed price change over a long-run sample mean price and to adjust their variance estimate accordingly. More precisely, their conditional mean and covariance matrices are assumed to satisfy
14)
where u t−1 and V t−1 are sample means and covariance matrices of past market
following strategy, and γ j measures the extrapolation rate and high (low) values of γ j correspond to strong (weak) extrapolation by trend followers, and λ measures the sensitivity of the second-moment estimate to the sample variance. This specification of the trend followers captures the extrapolative behavior of the trend followers, who expect price changes to occur in the same direction as the price trend observed over a past time window. Assume that u t−1 and V t−1 are computed recursively as
Effectively, the sample mean and variance-covariance matrix are calculated based on the all historical prices p t−1 , p t−2 , · · · , spreading back to −∞ with geometric decaying probability weights (1 − δ){1, δ, δ 2 , · · · }. Therefore, as δ decreases, the weights on the latest prices increase but decay geometrically at a common rate of δ.
For γ > 0 and large δ, momentum traders calculate the trend based on a long time horizon. In particular, when δ = 0, E c,t (p t+1 ) = p t−1 and V t−1 = 0, implying naive behaviour by the trend followers. However, when δ = 1, u t−1 = u 0 and V t−1 = V 0 , and therefore E c,t (p t+1 ) = p t−1 +γ(p t−1 −u 0 ), so that trend followers are momentum traders.
2.8. The Complete Dynamic Model. Based on the analysis above, the optimal demands of the fundamentalists and trend followers are given, respectively, by
Finally, the general dynamic model (2.6) reduces to the random nonlinear dynamical
In summary, we have established an adaptively heterogeneous beliefs model of asset prices under the CAPM framework. The resulting model is characterized by a stochastic difference system with seven variables, which is difficult to analyze directly. To understand the interaction of the deterministic dynamics and noise processes, we first study the dynamics of the corresponding deterministic model in Section 3. The stochastic model (2.18) is then analyzed in Section 4.
Dynamics of the Deterministic Model
By assuming that the fundamental price and the dividend are constants p * t = p * , d t =d, and there is no supply shock ξ t = 0, the system (2.18) becomes the deterministic dynamical system
The dynamical system (3.1) should not be interpreted as a deterministic approximation of stochastic system (2.18), based on some type of asymptotic convergence, but just as a system obtained by setting the dividend, the supply and the fundamental price at their unconditional mean levels. The analysis of this 'deterministic skeleton' is a common practice in the heterogeneous-agent literature, and it is aimed at gaining some initial insights into the impact of the parameters on the underlying dynamics. Although the properties of the deterministic skeleton do not carry over to the stochastic model in general, important connections between the dynamical structure of the stochastic model and that of the underlying deterministic model exist and have been highlighted in recent literature on stochastic heterogeneous-agent models (see, e.g. Chiarella, He and Zheng (2011) and Zhu, Wang and Guo (2011) ).
The system (3.1) has a unique steady state (p t , u t , V t , n f,t ) = (p * , p * , 0, n * f ), where, following Eq. (2.12), the fundamental steady state price, p * , is given by
11 The state variables p t , u t , V t and n f,t in Eq. (3.1) can be expressed in terms of p t−1 , u t−1 ,
and 1 dimensions respectively. So the dimension of the system (3.1) is N 2 + 5N + 2. For instance, when N = 1, it is an 8-dimensional system.
and n * f = 1/(1 + e ηC ∆ ). Hence, at the steady state, n *
For the N 2 + 5N + 2 dimensional system (3.1), we are able to obtain the following proposition on the local stability of the steady state. The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 3.1. For the system (3.1),
(ii) if R f < δ(1 + γ j ) for all j ∈ {1, · · · , N}, then the steady state is locally asymptotically stable when C ∆ = 0 and η < η j :=
for all j ∈ {1, · · · , N} and undergoes a Hopf bifurcation when η = η j for some j ∈ {1, · · · , N}. If C ∆ = 0, then the steady state is locally asymptotically stable when θ 0 γ j < α j + (1 + θ 0 )( The results in Proposition 3.1 are significant with respect to the intuitive and simple conditions on the stability of the steady state for such a high dimensional system. First, when the trend followers are not very active (so that γ j ≤ R f /δ − 1), the steady state of the system is stable. Second, the stability condition (ii) is equivalent to
Hence, even when the trend followers are active (so that γ j > R f /δ − 1), the system can still be stable when the fundamentalists dominate the market at the steady state or, equivalently, the switching intensity is sufficiently small. In short, Proposition 3.1 shows clearly that increases in C c , α j and θ c stabilize the system, while increases in C f , δ, γ and θ f destabilize the system. Intuitively, the fundamentalists play a stabilizing role in the market. The activity of fundamentalists is enhanced with an increase in α j or decreases in C f (since a decrease in C f increases the market fraction of fundamentalists) and θ f (since a decrease in θ f increases fundamentalists' long/short position when the fundamental price moves away from the market price).
To understand how the impact of switching in a market with many risky assets is different from a market with a single risky asset, we consider a special case where agents invest in a market with one risk-free asset and one risky asset, say asset j.
In this case, system (3.1) reduces to
The dynamics of the system (3.3) can be characterized by the following proposition (the proof is given in the appendix).
Proposition 3.2. For the system (3.3),
of the system is always locally asymptotically stable;
(ii) if R f < δ(1 + γ j ), then the steady state is locally asymptotically stable when η < η j and C ∆ = 0 and undergoes a Hopf bifurcation when η = η j . When C ∆ = 0, the steady state is locally asymptotically stable if θ 0 γ j < α j + (1 + θ 0 )(
By comparing the local stability conditions in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, one can see that the stability conditions of each risky asset due to the increasing switching intensity are independent of the parameters specific to any other asset and, surprisingly, the correlations among risky assets have no impact on the local stability properties.
12 This result is due to the peculiar properties of the Jacobian matrix and the adaptive behaviour considered (this becomes clear from the proofs in the appendix). Hence the local stability properties of asset j in the multi-asset model are exactly the same as if asset j was considered in isolation (that is, in the model with only risky asset j and the risk-free asset).
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 provide an initial insight into the mechanisms governing the joint price dynamics of multiple risky assets, showing that locally instability plays a very small role in the spill-over phenomena that we will discuss in what follows, but globally the instability of one asset can spill over to the other assets due to its correlations with other assets.
To better understand the implications of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 and the price dynamics of the model, we consider an example of two risky assets and a riskless asset with In this paper, we consider monthly time steps (i.e. K = 12).
Based on this set of parameters, the model has the following implications. First, the equilibrium steady state fundamental price decreases when the correlation coefficient increases and, when the fundamental strategy costs more than the trend follower strategy, the steady state market fraction of the fundamentalists reduces as the switching intensity increases. These results are illustrated in Figs. 3.1 (a) and 12 Mathematically, this is due to the fact that the fitness measure and the variance-covariance matrices are in higher order terms. Certainly they can affect the nonlinear dynamics, but not the dynamics of the linearized system.
13 The set of parameters is fixed in all numerical analysis unless specified otherwise. 14 The annualised parameters are converted to monthly, weekly and daily parameters in the standard way, by rescaling r f , Ω 0 , α,d, γ, C f and C c via the factor 1/K, where the frequency K is set to 12 (monthly), 50 (weekly), 250 (daily). As shown in Chiarella et al. (2012) , the parameter δ is converted to Kδ/[1 + (K − 1)δ] to preserve the average memory length of the time average of past returns. (b) respectively for the two-asset system (3.1). In fact, Eq. (3.2) determines the dependence of the steady state fundamental price on the parameters. Fig. 3.1 (a) illustrates a negative linear relationship between the fundamental steady state price
2 ) and the correlation ρ 12 . Secondly, as implied by Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, asset prices become unstable as the switching intensity η increases. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 .2. With the chosen parameters, one can verify that R f < δ(1+γ j ) for j = 1, 2, and the bifurcation values for asset one and two are η 1 ≈ 2.2384 and η 2 ≈ 3.0485 respectively. According to Proposition 3.1, when η < η 1 the two prices are stable; when η 1 < η < η 2 , the price of asset two is still stable, however the price of asset one becomes unstable; when η > η 2 , the prices of both assets become unstable.
15 Fig. 3 .2 plots the price bifurcation diagrams with respect to the switching intensity parameter η for both system (3.1) with two risky assets and system (3.3) with one risky asset. For the single risky asset model, Figs. 3.2 (c) and (d) show that an increase in the switching intensity η makes the steady state price unstable, leading to the complicated price dynamics documented in Brock and Hommes (1998) . With two risky assets, Figs.
15 Note that here we use the words 'stable' and 'unstable' in a loose, yet intuitive, sense. Strictly speaking, the local asymptotic stability of the steady state of the multi-asset model is lost when η = min j η j , as stated in Proposition 3.1. further evidence on the analysis above. At first, both assets and the market fraction are stable and constant when η = 1.5 is small (Fig. 3.3 (a) ). As η increases to 2.5, asset one and then asset two become unstable as illustrated in Fig. 3.3 (b) . As η increases to 3.5, both asset prices become unstable (see Fig. 3.3 (c) ). Also the price of risky asset one of the two asset model is more irregular compared to the regular fluctuations in Fig. 3.3 (f) of the one asset model. Also, as the switching intensity η increases, even small fluctuations in the market fractions of agents can cause large fluctuations in asset prices. Thirdly, the model displays a very interesting spill-over effect, which can be very different from portfolio effect. As we discussed earlier, the stability is a local result and the stability conditions of the risky assets are independent among the risky assets. When one asset becomes unstable, one would expect the spill-over of instability of the asset to spread to the other assets due to the portfolio effect. However, this may not always be the case, as demonstrated in Fig. 3 .4. For η = 2.5, Fig.   3 .4 (a) shows that the price is unstable for asset one, but stable for asset two. Intuitively, the price fluctuations in asset one would be caused by changing portfolio positions taken by the two types of agents for asset one, which is confirmed by Fig.   3 .4 (c). However, this intuition does not carry over to asset two for which the price is constant but the portfolio positions taken by agents for the asset are also varying, as illustrated in Fig. 3.4 (d) . The portfolio variations due to the portfolio effect lead to the fluctuations of the portfolio values of the agents that are illustrated in Fig. 3.4 (b) . How can this happen? As a matter of fact, there are two reasons behind this interesting phenomena. First, the variations of the risky assets in the portfolios are caused by the correlation between risky assets (reflected in both Ω o and V t ) and the time-varying population fractions. Hence, even when the price of asset two is constant, the portfolio positions of agents in asset two may not be constant. Secondly, the spill-over effect is a nonlinear rather than a linear effect, meaning that the stability of asset two in the nonlinear system is observed when the initial values are near the steady state values; otherwise, stability may not be maintained. Fig. 3 .5 shows how the instability of asset one spill over to asset two for η ∈ (η 1 ,η 2 ) increases from 2.24 in (a) to 2.5 in (b) and then to 3.04 in (c) when the initial prices are far away from the steady state price levels. Note that asset two is locally stable for η ∈ (η 1 ,η 2 ). Hence the spill-over effect reflects the dynamics of the nonlinear system. In fact, we do observe such spill-over effects in the bifurcation plots in Fig. 3.2 . Note that the first small price jump of asset one in Fig. 3.2 (a) after the initial bifurcation (at η =η 1 ) occurs at η =η 2 , which is the bifurcation of the second asset in the single asset model (in Fig. 3.2 (d) ). This implies that, when asset two becomes unstable, there is a spill-over effect from asset two to asset one characterized by the price jump of asset one nearη 2 . Interestingly, as the intensity increases further, say η ≈ 3.4, the fluctuations of asset one increases significantly, which is demonstrated by the large price jump of asset one for η > 3.4. In addition, numerical simulations (not reported here) show that an increase in ρ 12 leads to increases in the fluctuations of the prices when the system (3.1) becomes unstable. Intuitively, as the correlation of the two risky assets increases, diversification becomes less effective, hence assets become more risky, and consequently the fundamental equilibrium prices decrease (in order to have a high expected return).
Also, simulations show (not reported here) that market prices become more volatile when the trend followers are less concerned about the sample variance; that is when λ becomes small, even though λ does not affect the local stability of the system (3.1). In fact, when λ becomes small, the demand of the trend followers increases so that they become more active in the market, leading to a more volatile market.
In summary, we have shown that the rational behaviour of agents in switching to better performing strategies can lead to market instability and a non-linear spillover of price fluctuations from one asset to other assets. The nonlinear dynamics due to the spill-over effect can lead to high trading volume and high volatility. This becomes clearer in the discussion of the stochastic model in the next section.
Price Behaviour of the Stochastic Model
In this section, through numerical simulations, we first focus on the spill-over effect by examining the interaction between the dynamics of the deterministic model and the noise processes and explore the potential power of the model to explain price deviations from the fundamental prices and also high volatility. We then provide an fluctuates around the fundamental price in a cyclical fashion with about 29% of the fundamentalists, which is underlined by the bifurcation of periodic oscillations of the corresponding deterministic model (see Fig. 3.3 (c) ). Corresponding to Fig. 3.4 for the deterministic model, Fig. 4.2 
Define the returns of risky asset j and the market portfolio m, respectively, by the ex-ante betas of the risky assets; and the estimates of the betas using rolling windows of (e) 100 and (f) 300 with η = 1.5.
from which
Following , we obtain the standard CAPM-like return relation
where
are the beta coefficients in market equilibrium. Notice that the betas in Eq. (4.4) are ex-ante in the sense that they reflect the market equilibrium condition under the consensus belief E a,t and Ω a,t . In addition, Eq. (4.2) also implies r m,t+1 = ω ⊤ t r t+1 , leading to ω ⊤ t β a,t = 1, where the ex-ante betas of the risky assets; and the estimates of the betas using rolling windows of (e) 100 and (f) 300 with η = 3.5.
To examine the time-varying betas of the stochastic model, we choose two switching intensities η = 1.5 and 3.5 as before. The time series of the market prices, fractions of the fundamentalists, the proportions of the market portfolio invested in the two risky assets, the ex-ante betas of the risky assets, and the estimates of the betas using rolling windows of 100 and 300 are illustrated in Fig. 4 .3 for η = 1.5 and in Fig. 4 .4 for η = 3.5. For η = 1.5, the fundamental price of the deterministic model is stable, the variation of the beta coefficients in Fig 4.3. Trading Volume and Volatility. Finally, we examine the dynamic relation between price volatility and trading volume. As in Banerjee and Kremer (2010) , the price volatility is measured by the price difference |p j,t − p j,t−1 | and the trading volume at time t is defined by X t = min{n f,t−1 , n f,t }|z f,t − z f,t−1 | + min{n c,t−1 , n c,t }|z c,t − z c,t−1 | + |n f,t − n f,t−1 |X t , (4.5)
Due to the switching mechanism, the total trading volume X t in (4.5) can be decomposed into three components. The first and second components correspond to the trading volume of the agents who use, respectively, the fundamental and trend following trading strategies at both time t − 1 and t. The third component corresponds to the trading volume of those agents who change their strategies from t − 1 to t. In particular, when n f,t > n f,t−1 , a fraction of n f,t − n f,t−1 agents change their strategies from the trend following strategy at time t − 1 (with a demand of z c,t−1 ) to the fundamental strategy at time t (with a demand of z f,t ). trading volumes of the two assets are high when both assets are highly correlated.
The result is very intuitive; when the payoffs are less correlated in agents' beliefs, both price volatility and trading volume of the two assets are also less correlated. In summary, the persistence in price volatility and trading volume and the autocorrelation patterns in volatility and trading volume illustrated by the model are closely related to the characteristics of financial markets.
Conclusion
This paper extends the single-period equilibrium CAPM of to a dynamic equilibrium evolutionary CAPM to incorporate the adaptively switching behaviour of heterogeneous agents. By analyzing the stability of the underlying deterministic model, we show that the evolutionary CAPM is capable of characterizing the spill-over effects, the persistence in price volatility and trading volume, and realistic correlations between price volatility and trading volume. Also, the stochastic nature of time-varying betas implied by the equilibrium model may not be consistent with the rolling window estimate of betas used in the empirical literature.
The model provides further explanatory power of the recently developed HAMs.
In this paper, the numerical analysis is focused on the case of two risky assets, though the stability analysis is conducted for any number of risky assets. It would be interesting to see how an increase in the number of risky assets could have different effects. We expect the main results obtained in this paper to hold. The statistical analysis is mainly based on some Monte Carlo simulations and a systematical study of the empirical relevance using econometric methods would be interesting. We leave these issues to the future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
To provide some insights into the proof of the model with many risky assets, we first start with the case of one risky asset.
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3.2. In order to prove the local stability properties of the deterministic model (3.1), we start from the simplified one-risky-asset case (3.3). We omit the index j of the unique risky asset for simplicity.
Note that p t depends only on p t−1 , u t−1 , V t−1 , and on n f,t . The same holds for the state variables u t and V t . The differential of the fitness functions at time t, v ∆,t , depends on p t−2 , u t−2 , V t−2 and p t−1 through the demand functions z f,t−1 and z c,t−1 , on n f,t−1 through θ a,t−1 , as well as on p t , p t−1 , p t−2 directly. Formally, suitable changes of variables allow us to express the dynamical system (3.3) as an 8-dimensional map, by which the state of the system at time t is expressed as a function of the state of the system at time t − 1. We set
so that we can write the map driving dynamical system (3.3) as p t = F (p t−1 , u t−1 , V t−1 , q f,t−1 ), u t = δu t−1 + (1 − δ)F (p t−1 , u t−1 , V t−1 , q f,t−1 ), V t = δV t−1 + δ(1 − δ) [F (p t−1 , u t−1 , V t−1 , q f,t−1 ) − u t−1 ] 2 , q f,t = 1 + exp −ηQ(p t−1 , u t−1 , V t−1 , q f,t−1 , p
In particular, the function Q in the fourth equation above corresponds to v ∆,t , and has the structure Q = v ∆,t =ζ f,t−1πf,t −ζ c,t−1πc,t − C ∆ ,
where, for h ∈ {f, c}, ζ h,t−1 := z h,t−1 − θ a,t−1 θ h s,π h,t := p t + d − R f p t−1 − θ h 2 σ 2 h,t−1 z h,t−1 + θ a,t−1 θ h s and σ 2 h,t−1 = σ 2 for h = f , σ 2 h,t−1 = σ 2 + λV t−2 for h = c. One can check that botĥ ζ h,t−1 andπ h,t vanish at the fundamental steady state. It follows that all the partial derivatives of Q with respect to any of the state variables also vanish at the steady state, and the same holds for the derivatives of q f,t . Also, all the partial derivatives of V t (except ∂V t /∂V t−1 ) are zero at the steady state due to the higher-order term (p t − u t−1 ) 2 and the fact that p = u at the steady state. By ordering the variables as 
A.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Consider the general case (3.1) of N risky assets. The structure of the map is the same as in the simplified one-risky-asset case, except that the variables p t , u t , p where, for h = f, c, ζ h,t−1 := z h,t−1 − θ a,t−1 θ h s,π h,t := p t + d − R f p t−1 − θ h 2 Ω h,t−1 z h,t−1 + θ a,t−1 θ h s ,
with Ω h,t−1 = Ω 0 for h = f and Ω h,t−1 = Ω 0 + λV t−2 for h = c. Similar to the oneasset case, bothζ h,t−1 andπ h,t vanish at the fundamental steady state, and the same holds for any of the partial derivatives of q f,t . The Jacobian matrix of the system of dimension N 2 + 5N + 2 at the fundamental steady state is thus again characterized by the structure (A.1), where the variables are ordered as p, u, Again, what matters for stability are the eigenvalues of the upper left block (of dimension 2N × 2N), given by
Consider now the difference equation for the price vector p t = F(p t−1 , u t−1 , V t−1 , q f,t−1 ).
17 The null matrices in the third row of A now have dimension M × N (first and second entry) and M × 1 (fourth entry). The identity matrix in the third entry has dimension M . The identity matrix in the second row has dimension N .
if θ 0 γ j < α j + (1 + θ 0 )( R f δ − 1). Since stability requires that condition (A.4) holds for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, the statement of Proposition 3.1 follows.
